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Abstract: 
In order to develop a model of equitable and sustainable distribution, this paper advocates 
integrating the ecological space paradigm and the capabilities approach. As the currency of 
distribution, this account proposes a hybrid of capabilities and ecological space. Although the 
goal of distributive justice should be to secure and promote people’s capabilities now and in 
the future, doing so requires acknowledging that these capabilities are dependent on the 
biophysical preconditions as well as inculcating the ethos of restraint. Both issues have been 
highlighted from the perspective of the ecological space paradigm. Concerning the scope of 
distributive justice, the integration can combine the advantages of the ecological space 
paradigm regarding the allocation of the responsibilities involved in environmental 
sustainability with the strength of the capabilities approach regarding people’s entitlements. 
The pattern of distribution starts from a capability threshold. In order to achieve this 
threshold, ecological space should be provided sufficiently, and the remaining ecological 
space budget could then be distributed according to the equal per capita principle.  
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1.  Introduction 
  
Although countries across the world have been converging towards higher levels of human 
development, the global situation is characterized by both social injustice and unsustainability. 
First, despite the observable progress, there are still large disparities in, for example, income 
and health (United Nations Development Programme – UNDP 2013, p. 23). Second, the gains 
in human well-being over the last decades have been achieved at a cost, including the 
degradation of ecosystems, substantial and irreversible losses in biodiversity, increased risks 
of nonlinear changes (such as disease emergence and abrupt regional climate shifts) (MEA 
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2005, p. 1; Schellnhuber et al. 2005, p. 13). Anthropogenic climate change is a prominent 
example of human-induced changes to the environment and represents one of the most serious 
and far-reaching challenges facing humankind. Driven by an unsustainable rate of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the past few decades, human influence 
has led to unequivocal warming of the climate system and many changes that are 
unprecedented over decades to millennia (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – 
IPCC 2013, p. 2). Without mitigation, climate change is projected to result further inter alia in 
sea level rise, floods, increased frequency and magnitude of extreme weather events (such as 
storms, heatwaves and droughts), biodiversity loss and changes in precipitation patterns 
(Costello et al. 2009, pp. 1698-1699; McMichael & Lindgren 2011, p. 402; Meehl et al. 2007, 
pp. 782-789). These events are already impacting human life: for example, a conservative 
estimate attributes a disease burden of 5.5 million disability adjusted life years lost in 2000 to 
climate change (Costello et al. 2009, pp. 1700-1701). Yet, future people will suffer most from 
the harmful consequences of unmitigated climate change. Effects on human life include 
increased mortality (related to, for example, the increased frequency and magnitude of 
heatwaves), food and water insecurity, the spread and exacerbation of diseases, conflicts 
resulting from resource scarcity, and increased migration (Confalonieri et al. 2007, pp. 396-
406; Costello et al. 2009, pp. 1700-1701; McMichael & Lindgren 2011, pp. 403-404; 
McMichael et al. 2008, p. 192). Mitigation is therefore vital in order not to exacerbate the 
adverse effects of climate change and to reduce the root cause of the problem (Füssel 2007, p. 
265; Jamieson 2005, p. 222-224). This clearly illustrates the need to respect the ecosphere’s 
biophysical constraints.1 
 Social justice (which focuses on equity and people’s quality of life) and environmental 
sustainability (which most fundamentally requires that human activities be confined within 
the ecosphere’s biophysical constraints) are most often regarded as compatible objectives, 
assuming that environmental sustainability is a precondition for social justice and/or that 
social justice produces environmental sustainability (Dobson 2003, p. 84). Yet, this 
compatibility depends on the respective conceptions of both objectives (the determination of 
their defining terms as well as policy strategies to achieve them), which might also conflict: 
increasing social justice could be achieved at the cost of a deteriorating environment and vice 
                                                        
1
 Since climate change already affects people’s well-being and the climate will continue to change for the 
foreseeable future due to the accumulated GHGs and the inertia of the climate system, an equitable climate 
policy should also comprise adaptation and compensation measures (Caney 2009, pp. 126-27; Füssel 2007, p. 
266; Jamieson 2005, p. 222; Klein et al. 2007, p. 750). Nonetheless, due to space constraints, we cannot address 
these aspects here. 
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versa (Dobson 1998, p. 3). For example, economic growth is still widely considered to be the 
most appropriate strategy to maintain and increase people’s quality of life, although it is 
clearly environmentally unsustainable. Vice versa, reducing aggregate environmental impacts 
without recognizing people’s developmental entitlements or unfairly distributing the burdens 
involved in mitigating climate change cannot be acceptable. Neither environmental 
sustainability nor social justice has such overriding legitimacy: neither an environmentally 
sustainable but socially unjust society, nor a society that is socially wholly just, yet destined 
for swift ecological collapse, would be acceptable. In sum, ‘both objectives will continually 
vie for attention’ (ibid., p. 4).  
 Therefore, building on the Brundtland Commission’s definition of sustainable development 
(World Commission on Development and Environment – WCED 1987, p. 41) and the third 
principle of the Rio Declaration (United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development – UNCED 1992), the aim of this paper is to develop a model for equitable and 
sustainable distribution, in order to secure and promote the developmental and environmental 
preconditions for current as well as future people’s quality of life. 2 
 Any account of distributive justice has to answer at least three questions: what is 
distributed (currency)?; who are the legitimate recipients and providers of (re)distribution 
(scope)?; and according to which principle(s) should distribution take place (pattern)? 
Moreover, in view of the fact that neither social justice nor environmental sustainability have 
overriding legitimacy, a comprehensive account of distributive justice needs to clarify how 
both the objectives of social justice and environmental sustainability are incorporated on all 
three dimensions. The goal of this paper is to advocate an integration of the Ecological Space 
Paradigm (ESP) and the Capabilities Approach in order to combine their advantages on all 
three dimensions in a comprehensive account of equitable and sustainable distribution. At the 
outset, however, we should like to point out that this paper can only provide a general sketch 
of the integrative account; a detailed analysis of all the related issues falls beyond its scope.  
 
2.  Currency: what is distributed? 
 
According to Hayward (2007, pp. 445-446), ecological space ‘comprises all the 
environmental goods and natural resources that play a part in the socio-economic life of 
                                                        
2
 This focus on justice between contemporaries and between current and future people does not include historical 
responsibility. We cannot adequately address this issue here, although we believe that the historical record gives 
rise to crosscutting implications regarding social justice as well as environmental sustainability. In addition, 
issues of justice towards the environment also fall beyond the scope of this paper. 
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humankind.’ We use it here as shorthand to denote the provisional, regulating, cultural, and 
supporting services that ecosystems and the Earth as a whole deliver (MEA 2005, p. 39-46; 
Steffen et al. 2011, p. 740). The ESP has been operationalized in several ways, most 
importantly, the distribution of GHG emissions permits, the Ecological Footprint (e.g. 
Wackernagel & Rees 1996), and the Safe Operating Space for Humanity (SOSH) (Rockström 
et al. 2009).3  
 The Earth’s ecosystems and the services they provide are the preconditions for human life 
(MEA 2005, p. 1; Rockström et al. 2009, p. 474). One of the key insights and major strengths 
of the ESP is precisely that in order to secure and sustain these biophysical preconditions for 
everyone – now and in the future – humanity has a moral obligation to refrain from 
transgressing the ecosphere’s biophysical constraints (Chambers et al. 2000, p. 2; Rockström 
2009, p. 472; Ross 2009, p. 54). In other words, those of us currently over-consuming and 
over-polluting ‘require the inculcation of an ethic, an ethos, of restraint to accompany and 
underpin the recognition of our obligations to reduce our demands on resources’ (Hayward 
2009, p. 290). 
 Nonetheless, important remaining methodological issues and scientific uncertainties 
(predominantly regarding target-setting and defining biophysical constraints)4 indicate that the 
identification of the ecosphere’s biophysical constraints ultimately depends on political 
agreement and normative choice – which is difficult in the current global political situation 
that is characterized by large inequalities in resources and entitlements (Biermann 2012, p. 6). 
Consider for example target-setting regarding climate change mitigation. There is general 
political agreement that global warming should be limited to 2°C above pre-industrial levels 
(see for example United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – UNFCCC 
2009, Paragraph 1). Some scientific accounts have adopted this 2°C threshold as the starting 
point for determining the maximum allowable GHG emissions (for example, Allen 2009, p. 
114; Rockström et al. 2009). However, since emissions continue to track the average of the 
most carbon-intense scenarios put forward by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, the 2°C target becomes less plausible as a realistic goal since a rise of at least 4°C 
                                                        
3
 Other operationalizations of the ESP include Environmental Utilization Space (Opschoor & van der Straaten 
1993), Material Flow Analysis (Bringezu & Moriguchi, 2002), Industrial Metabolism (Ayres 1997) and other 
indicators of environmental sustainability.  
4
 Methodological issues have been predominantly discussed regarding the Ecological Footprint (e.g., van den 
Bergh & Grazi, 2010; van den Bergh & Verbruggen 1999; Fiala 2008), although Nature Reports Climate Change 
has dedicated a special issue to scrutiny of the SOSH framework (Vol. 3(10), October 2009; e.g. Allen 2009). A 
discussion of these methodological issues falls beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the most important 
normative issues are mentioned in the remainder of this section, although as yet, they arguably remain 
underdeveloped in the literature. 
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increasingly becomes unavoidable (Le Quéré, 2009, p. 831; Dirix et al. 2013). Moreover, this 
is not only a methodological issue, but also a normative one, for it involves the questions of 
how much climate change is acceptable and to what extent we are willing or able to mitigate 
global warming: identifying “dangerous” climate change is ‘a complex task that can only be 
partially supported by science, as it inherently involves normative judgements’ (Rogner et al. 
2007, p. 99). Indeed, despite general political agreement regarding the 2°C target, the Alliance 
of Small Island States (AOSIS) has declared that global warming must be kept well below 
1.5°C (2012, Paragraph 8A), since they are especially vulnerable to and already experiencing 
climate change adversities (AOSIS 2012, Paragraph 1-3; UNDP 2011, pp. 35-36). In contrast, 
richer societies – who have polluted most – might be disinclined to adopt more conservative 
thresholds, because these require most mitigation efforts from them first, while they have the 
greatest interest in the continuation of the current system (Biermann 2012, p. 6; Gardiner 
2006, p. 401). 
 Even in view of these methodological, normative, and political complications, Biermann 
insists that a framework such as the SOSH is likely to develop into a powerful political 
narrative – as Ecological Footprint Analysis arguably already is. Moreover, all the 
operationalizations mentioned above clearly show that humanity is currently transgressing the 
ecosphere’s biophysical constraints. To mention but one example, the key finding of 
Rockström and colleagues (2009, p. 472) in their analysis of the SOSH is that humanity has 
already left its safe operating space by trespassing the planetary boundaries of at least three 
systems (biodiversity loss, climate change and interference with the nitrogen cycle), and is 
rapidly approaching several other boundaries (freshwater use, land-system change and, 
arguably, ocean acidification). In sum, even though the scientific uncertainties and 
methodological issues remain significant, the ESP undeniably shows that humanity’s current 
demands are unsustainable and that action is urgently needed for tackling climate and other 
adverse environmental changes. 
 Yet, despite these insights, designating ecological space as the currency of distribution 
faces certain objections. It has been observed that ecological space is an all-purpose means 
required to have a good quality of life, rather than being a direct measure of well-being (Page 
2007, pp. 460-461). Sen (1979, p. 216; 1990, pp. 119-120) has argued that such resourcist 
accounts have an element of ‘fetishism’, because they focus on means rather than ends, 
whereas quality of life should be conceived as a relationship between persons and goods. 
Indeed, for example, GHG emission permits (but also other parts of ecological space) only 
have instrumental value in relation to their ability to pursue various goals (Caney 2009, p. 
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130). Moreover, many issues of social justice – such as the political underrepresentation of 
women or personal disadvantages related to mental or physical illness – cannot be traced to 
environmental problems or to the appropriation of environmental goods (Page 2007, p. 461). 
Since ecological space as the currency of distribution is only indirectly connected to human 
well-being, it seems unable to provide a comprehensive focus of our distributive concerns. In 
sum, the ESP cannot be said to offer a complete account of distributive justice, for even 
though it delivers valuable insights on environmental sustainability, it is inadequate to capture 
issues of social justice beyond the distribution of environmental goods and services.  
 In view of his objections to resourcist accounts, Sen (1999, p. 74) advocates a focus on ‘the 
substantive freedoms – the capabilities – to choose a life one has reason to value’, rather than 
on the means to freedom. However, the capabilities approach’s emphasis on the value of 
individual freedom – including the possibly infinite expansion of people’s material freedoms 
and capabilities – cannot adequately address environmental sustainability (Crabtree 2010, p. 
163; Peeters et al. 2013, pp. 63-64). Indeed, the issues central to environmental sustainability 
have only recently been taken up by capability theorists (see e.g. Holland 2008; Lessmann 
2011; Lessmann & Rauschmayer 2013; Pelenc et al. 2013; Schultz et al. 2013). These debates 
mainly point towards two problematic issues in the capabilities approach related to 
environmental sustainability: first, it arguably disregards the importance of the biophysical 
preconditions for enjoying capabilities; and second, it has not yet exhaustively addressed the 
imperative of environmental sustainability that fundamentally requires humanity to refrain 
from transgressing the biophysical constraints of the ecosphere. Addressing these two issues 
and connecting the environmental dimension with human flourishing that is central to social 
justice solicits the input of theories external to the capabilities approach (Schultz et al. 2013, 
p. 130). Therefore, especially in light of the advantages mentioned above, we argue that the 
ESP can offer certain insights needed to incorporate the importance of the biophysical 
preconditions as well as the requirement to refrain from transgressing the ecosphere’s 
biophysical constraints.  
 First, the capabilities approach does recognize the central importance of the health of 
ecosystems for allowing people to lead the lives they value (Anand & Sen 2000, p. 2030; Sen 
2010, p. 130; 2013, pp. 7-8; Nussbaum 2011, p. 163). Nonetheless, this acknowledgement of 
the role of the environment as a key dimension of human wellbeing remains ambiguous in 
both Sen and Nussbaum’s versions of the capabilities approach (Holland 2008, p. 320; Pelenc 
et al. 2013, p. 78). Therefore, Holland (2008, p. 323) has proposed the addition of Sustainable 
Ecological Capacity as a meta-capability, which encompasses the ecological conditions that 
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can provide environmental resources and services that enable people’s range of capabilities 
now and in the future. The ESP and its concretizations offer information about the ecological 
conditions and the sustainable appropriation of the environmental resources and services.  
 In accordance with Holland’s account, we propose to differentiate between social and 
material preconditions for enjoying capabilities. For example, the bodily integrity capability 
includes being able to move freely from place to place (Nussbaum 2006, p. 76), which clearly 
presupposes the availability of material conditions (such as adequate transportation), as well 
as particular social conditions (for example, robust traffic regulations). As the ESP clearly 
shows, material justice – securing these material conditions for everyone – ‘has its own 
precondition, namely the integrity of the compendious resources of the biophysical world’ 
(Hayward 2009, p. 292). Differentiating between social and material (and thus, 
environmental) preconditions for enjoying capabilities acknowledges our dependency on the 
environment, rather than interpreting capabilities as ‘a set of disembodied freedoms’ (Jackson 
2009, p. 45).  
 Second, the assumption of environmental sustainability that ‘the current generation might 
have to restrict itself in some ways (e.g. restrict its consumption) in order to ensure the 
preservation of the opportunity for a full life for future generations’ has not yet been given 
profound theoretical consideration by the main protagonists of the capabilities approach 
(Lessmann 2011, p. 50). For example, in their attempt to deal with the issue of sustainable 
development, Anand and Sen (2000, p. 2038) focus on enhancing current people’s capabilities 
as not only intrinsically important, but also instrumentally important in ‘increasing their 
“human capital” with lasting influence in the future,’ which should be seen as a major 
contribution to the achievement of sustainability. This might be true in cases such as women’s 
empowerment and reproductive rights, which are inherently valuable and have positive 
spillover effects on the environment through reducing fertility rates (Sen 1999, p. 226; 2009, 
p. 249; 2013, p. 15; UNDP 2011, pp. 73-75).5 In other cases, however, this account begs the 
question, for improving people’s capabilities usually takes its toll on the environment, 
especially when the development model is premised on ecological abundance and includes the 
possibility of infinite economic expansion (see also Crabtree 2010, p. 163; Rauschmayer et al. 
2011, p. 13). Indeed, although the capabilities approach criticizes the mere focus on economic 
growth for being an insufficient basis for human development and for having little intrinsic 
merit, at the same time, it affirms economic growth as an important means to expand people’s 
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 The UNDP has used Sen’s capabilities approach as the conceptual basis in its analysis of contemporary 
development challenges in its annual Human Development Reports (Fukuda-Parr, 2003, p. 302). 
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freedoms (see for example Anand & Sen 2000, p. 2030; Nussbaum 2006, pp. 70-71; Sen 
1999, p. 3; UNDP 2013, p. 21). Since economic expansion (and population growth) has 
negated the positive effects of increased efficiency (i.e., decreasing the resource intensity of 
production), the inculcation of an ethic of restraint in material consumption is a vital strategy 
for attaining environmental sustainability (Huesemann 2004, p. 267; Jackson 2009, p. 67; 
Mont & Plepys 2008, p. 531). However, the capabilities approach cannot adequately 
scrutinize or constrain the material – often luxury – consumption of the elite and the middle 
classes, since that would clash with the freedom and sovereignty of consumers and therefore, 
with the liberal neutrality between conceptions of the good life that is one of the central tenets 
of the capabilities approach (Mont & Plepys 2008, p. 531; Peeters et al. 2013, pp. 63-64). 
 One clear principle of restraint provided by liberalism and accepted (but not yet thoroughly 
investigated) by the capabilities approach is the harm principle (Mill 2008, p. 14; Deneulin 
2002, p. 510; Nussbaum 2000, p. 53). Yet, applying it to, for example, the issue of climate 
change is challenging, since the latter ‘is not a matter of a clearly identifiable individual 
acting intentionally so as to inflict an identifiable harm on another identifiable individual, 
closely related in time and space’ (Jamieson 2006, pp. 476-477). Shue (2001, p. 450), in 
contrast, maintains that the emitters of avoidable GHGs can be held responsible for the 
resultant infliction of physical harm. Elsewhere, we have attempted to develop the harm 
principle to address the responsibilities and obligations of current towards future people from 
the capabilities perspective, which led us to conclude that the insights of the ESP are 
indispensable for addressing distributive justice between current and future people (Peeters et 
al. 2013). Moreover, it might be questioned whether the harm principle is sufficient to build 
an adequate ethos of restraint from within liberalism, since restraint might also assume 
‘reevaluating the nature and extent of the benefits we ourselves draw from our activities, even 
when these do not immediately or obviously precipitate some harm on others’ (Hayward 
2009, p. 291). Thus, for example, materialist lifestyles might be criticized independently of 
their environmental impact for resulting in the ‘damaging social logic of consumerism’ 
(Jackson 2009, p. 102), and for leading to consumer anxiety, work stress and lack of time to 
enjoy other (e.g. social, cultural and political) activities.6 Nonetheless, the question arises as 
                                                        
6
 Hayward (2009, pp. 290-293) mentions that the imperative of restraint is not only a matter of the right (through 
its focus on the harm principle and the universal right of access to the necessary means for a decent life, which 
include biophysical assets), but a matter of the good as well, since it gives rise to a ‘green’ conception of the 
good life and to ‘green’ virtues. However, the capabilities approach does not accept this latter interpretation, 
because it conflicts with the value the capabilities approach places on liberal neutrality between conceptions of 
the good life (Nussbaum 1998). Moreover, we would like to note that a reevaluation of the benefits people draw 
from their material consumption in our example can also be merely informative regarding the trade-offs they 
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to how to evaluate the benefits of our activities, because the ESP’s focus on the means 
necessary for well-being is vulnerable to Sen’s criticism of “fetishism” mentioned above. The 
benefits from environmental appropriation should therefore be evaluated in terms of social 
justice – and thus quality of life – but given its focus on resources, the ESP is inadequate to do 
this.  
 In sum, we recommend integrating the ESP and the capabilities approach. On the one hand, 
the currency of distribution should reflect the focus on people’s entitlements and their ability 
to pursue flourishing – a key part of the capabilities approach. On the other hand, distribution 
should take account of the preconditional character of the integrity of ecosystems by 
differentiating between material (and environmental) and social conditions for enjoying 
capabilities, based on the information about environmental resources and services provided by 
the ESP. Moreover, an ethos of restraint – to which the ESP clearly draws our attention – 
should be incorporated. We will return to operationalizing the latter when discussing the 
pattern of distribution, but we must first turn to the question of scope.  
 
3.  Scope: who are the legitimate recipients and providers of (re)distribution? 
 
While other currencies of distributive justice (such as welfare, resources and, as we will 
explain below, capabilities) are primarily designed to apply to relations of distribution 
between contemporaries, with their intertemporal implications being a matter of further 
deliberation, ‘ecological space turns this methodological approach on its head by embracing 
an explicit commitment to intergenerational justice at the outset’ (Page 2007, p. 461). Central 
to the ESP is the protection of the physical integrity of ecosystems that provide the material 
preconditions for current as well as future people’s well-being. The ESP shows that 
humanity’s current material demands exceed the carrying capacity, which constitutes injustice 
towards future people since their quality of life will be adversely affected.  
 Through this focus on the unjust impacts of human activity on environmental integrity, the 
ESP is consistent with the preservation of the earth’s ability to sustain life, a central 
requirement of justice towards future people (Chambers et al. 2000, p. 46; Page 2007, p. 460). 
However, its applicability to distributive justice between contemporaries remains 
questionable, since the ESP does not adequately address social justice: it merely focuses on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
might experience between material prosperity and social participation – both of which they might value – 
without necessarily advocating a particular conception of the good life. However, since these issues need further 
analysis, we limit discussion here to the interpretation of the imperative of restraint as a matter of the right.  
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the means to achieve a good quality of life and many inequities are not traceable to the 
appropriation of ecological space.  
 In contrast, the advantage of the capabilities approach is that it captures well-being directly 
in terms of freedom, which we consider to be essential for justice between contemporaries as 
well as for social justice in general. Yet, the applicability of the capabilities approach towards 
future people remains a matter for deliberation and is increasingly discussed in recent 
literature. Anand and Sen (2000, p. 2030) have attempted to open the scope of the capabilities 
approach to include future people in the community of justice, arguing that sustainability 
reflects the universality of life claims: ‘the recognition of a shared claim of all to the basic 
capability to lead worthwhile lives.’ They argue that, since we do not know which preferences 
and capabilities future people will value, ‘we can talk of sustainability only in terms of 
conserving a capacity to produce well-being’ (ibid., p. 2035). However, rather than being 
substitutable by human capital (as Anand and Sen appear to claim), the ESP shows that the 
biophysical preconditions are pivotal in maintaining the capacity to produce well-being. 
Hence, the universality of life claims requires the protection and expansion of people’s 
capabilities today, while at the same time acknowledging the ecosphere’s biophysical 
constraints in order to protect the environmental preconditions on which future people’s 
capabilities depend. This implies incorporating an ethos of restraint, which the capabilities 
approach has failed to inculcate, but to which the ESP is dedicated.  
  Another way of putting this is by referring to the differentiation between entitlement- and 
duty-bearer justice. According to Caney (2009, p. 127), the necessity of preventing dangerous 
climate change is predominantly concerned with people’s entitlements that are jeopardised by 
climate change, but a robust climate policy would nonetheless be unfair if the duties involved 
were unfairly distributed. More generally, a coherent account of social justice and 
environmental sustainability involves adequately addressing both entitlements and duties. As 
regards entitlement-bearer justice, we agree with Anand & Sen (2000, p. 2030) that ethical 
universalism is fundamentally an elementary demand for impartiality, applied between 
contemporaries as well as between current and future people. Therefore, we endorse the 
universality of life claims in terms of capabilities: current and future people share the 
entitlement to the basic capabilities required for a worthwhile life.7 
                                                        
7
 Others have attempted to resolve the non-identity problem, without a satisfactory solution (see Davidson 2008).  
Here, we can only contend that future people, by virtue of being human, will all be entitled to human rights and 
capabilities that are threatened by inter alia climate change (Shue 2011, p. 293; 2013, p. 395). This contention 
affirms the moral intuition of duties towards future people, and provides the grounds for treating transgressions 
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 However, according to Pelenc et al. (2013, p. 82), this notion of capability needs to be 
complemented with an appropriate view of responsibility. Indeed, Dobson (2006b, p. 169) 
argues that the “thin” notion of universal entitlements is insufficient to motivate us to shoulder 
our responsibilities and does not provide a rationale for distributing these responsibilities. In 
view of environmental sustainability, the affirmation of universal entitlements entails the 
collective duty to refrain from transgressing the ecosphere’s biophysical constraints. However, 
although Nussbaum (2013, p. 478) seems to oppose further specification of who might have 
duties and when, an unspecified collective duty results in the well-known problem that each 
could pass the responsibility to someone else. Moreover, the burdens involved in discharging 
this collective duty should be fairly distributed, accounting for existing inequities. First, it 
should be acknowledged that not everyone suffers equally from environmental degradation 
(ibid., p. 19). For example, without appropriate redistributive policies, the social and 
economic costs of climate change will fall more heavily on the current poorest and future 
people (UNDP 2007, p. 64; Costello et al. 2009, p. 1694; Jamieson 2005, p. 227). Second, the 
ESP clearly shows that although we all partake in ecological space, we do not do so equally 
(Dobson 2006b, p. 176). These two observations point to the pervasive inequity of 
environmental impact, and the inverse relationship between environmental risk and 
responsibility (UNDP 2007, p. 43; Costello et al. 2009, p. 1694). The undistributed collective 
duty to refrain from transgressing the ecosphere’s biophysical constraints might obscure these 
inequities.  
 Therefore, Dobson (2006b, p. 173) refers to causal responsibility as a more compelling 
rationale for allocating remedial responsibility. According to him, the globally and 
intertemporally inequitable occupation of ecological space directly implies the remedial 
responsibility of reducing ecological space occupation where appropriate (Dobson 2006a, p. 
450). In other words, and in accordance with the ethos of restraint, duty-bearer justice 
involves the assignment of remedial responsibility to “ecological debtors” – people who 
exceed their fair share of ecological space – and requires of them a commitment to reduce 
their environmental impact to the permitted level (Hayward 2006, p. 368; 2007, p. 445; 2009, 
p. 283; Vanderheiden 2009, pp. 265-266).  
 In sum, the integration of the ESP and the capabilities approach meets the need to address 
issues of both entitlement- and duty-bearer justice. While the capabilities approach 
emphasizes impartiality and the universality of life claims as the core of entitlement-bearer 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of the ecosphere’s biophysical constraints as a wrongful harm – not only to current, but also to future people (see 
also Davidson 2008, p. 482). 
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justice, the ESP specifies the collective duty inherent to environmental sustainability on the 
basis of causal responsibility and ecological debt.  
 
4.  Pattern: according to which principle(s) should distribution take place?  
 
While Sen’s comparative approach to justice does not yield a specific distributive principle, 
Nussbaum (2006, p. 71; 2013, pp. 478, 485-486) argues that the goal of social policies should 
be understood in terms of getting citizens above a certain capability threshold beneath which 
human functioning is not available. According to her, people are entitled ‘to a life compatible 
with human dignity, and this entitlement means that the relevant goods must be available at a 
sufficiently high level’ (ibid., p. 292). She distinguishes between capabilities related to human 
dignity – to be secured equally – and instrumental capabilities that should be secured 
sufficiently (ibid., pp. 292-293). As mentioned above in our discussion of the currency of 
distribution, we would rather make the differentiation within capabilities: each capability 
requires that the corresponding social and material conditions be satisfied. First, in order for 
people to reach the threshold, social conditions must be secured equally, since they are closely 
related to human dignity and respect – in which cases it is the equal human dignity and 
respect that demands recognition (Shue 1999, p. 532; see also Nussbaum 2006, p. 292).  
 Second, the remainder of this section will focus on the appropriate principle for 
distributing the material conditions, which ultimately rely on ecological space. Indeed, an 
equal distribution of ecological space might not be consistent with human dignity or the 
capability threshold. Take for example the future allocation of GHG emissions entitlements,8 
the most obvious and intuitive defense of which starts from the equal per capita principle 
(Gardiner 2004, p. 583; Caney 2009, p. 130). Many defend an egalitarian distribution of GHG 
emissions (for example Jamieson 2005, p. 231) and a variant is advocated in the Contraction 
and Convergence proposal (Meyer 2000). Furthermore, politically, the equal per capita 
principle has been advocated by most of the developing countries, including China and India 
(Gardiner 2004, p. 583 n90). However, since the conversion of resources into freedoms and 
opportunities may vary from person to person, an egalitarian distribution ‘can go hand in hand 
with serious inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons’ (Sen 1990, p. 115). 
According to Sen (1990, pp. 111-112, 120-121; 1999, pp. 70-71), these interpersonal 
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 In this section, we will focus on the distribution of GHG emissions entitlements, since the discussion about the 
pattern of distribution is most advanced in this literature. It should be clear, however, that we consider ecological 
space also to comprise other essential environmental assets.  
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variations – connected inter alia with gender, genetic endowment, and social and cultural 
conditions – must form a crucial part of the informational basis of justice, but cannot be 
incorporated by an egalitarian account of resource distribution. Caney (2009, p. 130, emphasis 
in original) states that it is therefore implausible to focus on distributing resources equally, ‘if 
doing so will leave people unequal in their ability to pursue various goals.’  
 In view of this objection, a promising basis for modifying the equal per capita proposal 
might be provided by Shue’s (1993, pp. 56-59) normative differentiation between subsistence 
emissions and luxury emissions. According to him, ‘minimum vital emissions could be viewed 
as an inalienable private property right, or simply a human subsistence right’ (Shue 2001, p. 
455). While subsistence emissions permits should be handed out for free in order not to make 
the life of the poor impossible, emission permits beyond the necessity threshold should be 
paid for and be tradable, implying that the rich would bear the burden of climate change 
mitigation (Shue 1993, p. 59; 2001, p. 455; 2011, p. 307). This account has been developed 
further by Vanderheiden (2008, p. 243), whose modified equal shares model starts from the 
claim that ‘all persons are entitled as a matter of basic rights to survival emissions, or a level 
of emissions sufficient to allow for their basic human functioning.’ These survival emissions 
should be distributed so as to meet everyone’s basic rights, while remaining luxury emissions 
should be distributed on an equal per capita basis (ibid., pp. 226-227, 243). Such a modified 
equal shares model might partly meet Sen’s concerns about interpersonal variations, since it 
encompasses people’s differential abilities to reach subsistence. 
 We should like to emphasize that people are entitled ‘not only to mere life, but to a life 
compatible with human dignity’ (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 292) and hence, the focus on 
subsistence or survival should be reformulated as a capability threshold. The focus ultimately 
remains on securing people’s capabilities, and GHG emissions entitlements should be 
distributed so as to allow everybody to reach the threshold. Considering the capability 
threshold as the central criterion of distribution shows the important yet instrumental value of 
GHG emission entitlements. This insight might pre-empt a forceful objection against 
considering subsistence emissions as a fundamental right. Meeting people’s rights to 
subsistence emissions, Gardiner (2004, p. 585) argues, might have undesirable implications 
for attempts to tackle climate change: ‘if some emissions are deemed morally essential, then 
they may have to be guaranteed even if this leads to an overall allocation above the scientific 
optimum.’ This objection has also been voiced by Hayward (2007, p. 432-433), who asserts 
that we should deny that there is any human right to emissions; rather there is a human right 
to live in an unpolluted environment. According to him, the worst off do have a right of access 
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to the means for a decent life, but ‘emissions are not inherently necessary to fulfill that right’ 
(ibid., p. 432). The problem revealed by the fact that carbon emissions are currently necessary 
to secure subsistence for most people, is that they are locked into a carbon dependent 
economy. Shue (2001, p. 451; 2013, p. 392 esp. n. 34) acknowledges this issue, and 
emphasizes that the need for access to GHG emissions in order to reach subsistence is a 
function of the energy regime that is in place. As long as the lack of affordable sustainable 
energy makes many or most dependent on fossil fuels, they should be allowed to emit the 
GHGs necessary to reach the capability threshold level. Obviously, however, the development 
of alternatives could enable people to reach the threshold with less GHG emissions – and this 
strategy is clearly necessary to mitigate climate change without exacerbating poverty (Shue 
2013). Thus, the focus of developmental policies should be on the advancement of alternative 
energy, in order to reduce carbon dependence as soon and thoroughly as possible. 
Accordingly, the input of the capabilities approach in the integration might tackle the 
observation that GHG emissions are instrumentally, rather than inherently necessary for a 
good life.  
 A sufficientarian principle of distribution based on the capability threshold does not yet 
fully inculcate the ethos of restraint to which the ESP is dedicated. Environmental 
sustainability requires that people should refrain from exceeding their fair share of ecological 
space, and thus that their functionings beyond the capability threshold should be constrained 
in terms of their ecological space usage (Peeters et al. 2013, pp. 70-71). Indeed, in mitigating 
climate change, the second front of action – in addition to the development of alternatives to 
fossil fuels – is clearly that carbon emissions need to be cut back sharply (Shue 2011, p. 313). 
As regards the distribution of GHG emissions permits beyond the capability threshold, we 
agree with Vanderheiden (2008, pp. 226-227, 243; see above) that the egalitarian principle 
might be a good candidate. Although this would not meet Sen’s objection regarding 
interpersonal variations, it might be questioned whether equity requires taking account of 
interpersonal variations in attaining luxury, since people have an interest, but weaker or no 
rights to luxury emissions (Vanderheiden 2008, p. 243). 
 However, some issues related to the determination of the capability threshold have yet to 
be addressed. Determining what counts as necessary GHG emissions in order to reach the 
capability threshold seems procedurally odd, for such proposals appear ‘to envisage that the 
climate change problem can be resolved by appealing to some notion of social necessity that 
is independent of, and not open to, moral assessment’ (Gardiner 2004, p. 586). Merely 
focussing on the capability threshold – without a normative assessment of the environmental 
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impact of the GHG emissions necessary to achieve it – will not contribute to climate change 
mitigation. Moreover, there is ‘the implication that there is not necessarily any upper limit to 
the inefficient emissions that would be permissible in order to reach what might be necessary’ 
(Hayward 2007, p. 441). Finally, such proposals carry the political risk that there is nothing to 
stop some people claiming that almost any emission is essential to their way of life (Gardiner 
2004, p. 586). 
 These concerns are serious, and we can only briefly comment on them. Shue (2001, pp. 
454-455) contends that the issue of exceeding the global tolerable total emissions budget by 
securing the minimum essential for each person is a matter of scientific determination. As 
argued above, however, scientific advances may well be insufficient to offer a comprehensive 
resolution, since these issues ultimately depend on political and normative choices. 
Additionally, regarding the precise determination of the capability threshold, Nussbaum 
(2006, p. 402; 2011, pp. 41-42) relies on democratic debate, stating that we should avoid 
specifying unrealistically high or unjustifiably low capability thresholds. Taking 
environmental sustainability (and climate change mitigation) seriously complicates these 
issues, since it raises fundamental, and perhaps uncomfortable, moral questions regarding 
what we consider a “desirable” or targeted future, how we should live, and what kinds of 
societies we want (Banuri et al. 2001, pp. 97-98; Gardiner 2006, p. 402; Jamieson 1992, p. 
147). These questions illustrate the need to take account of both social justice and 
environmental sustainability: the determination of the precise thresholds must take account of 
people´s entitlements as well as the ecosphere’s biophysical constraints.  
 In sum, the integration of the ESP and the capabilities approach takes the capability 
threshold as its main feature. This threshold presupposes the equal provision of social 
conditions and the sufficient distribution of material conditions (and thus, ecological space). 
The ecological space remaining could be distributed on an equal per capita basis, which in 
effect constrains people’s functionings in terms of their ecological space appropriation, 
consistent with an ethos of restraint.  
  
5. Conclusion 
  
A comprehensive account of distributive justice needs to incorporate the objectives of both 
social justice and environmental sustainability. To address the challenge of balancing the 
competing goals of ensuring current and future people’s quality of life and living within the 
biophysical constraints, we have advocated integrating the ESP and the capabilities approach 
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into an account that encompasses distributive justice between contemporaries as well as 
between current and future people. 
 Although admittedly there are methodological, political and normative complications in 
operationalizing ecological space, the ESP delivers key insights regarding environmental 
sustainability and the imperative of restraint in view of the ecosphere’s biophysical 
constraints. However, the ESP seems unable to capture social justice, since it focuses on the 
means to achieve ends, whereas quality of life should be conceived as a relationship between 
persons and goods. The capabilities approach, in contrast, focuses on the substantive freedoms 
that are important for well-being, but it has not yet profoundly considered the central 
requirement of environmental sustainability, i.e. to refrain from transgressing biophysical 
constraints in order to secure and sustain the environmental preconditions for everyone – now 
and in the future. Therefore, as the currency of distribution, the integration proposes a hybrid 
of capabilities and ecological space. Distributive justice should aim at securing and promoting 
people’s capabilities now and in the future, but should also acknowledge that these 
capabilities are dependent on material conditions – ultimately on biophysical preconditions – 
which requires including the ethos of restraint to which the ESP is dedicated.   
 Concerning the scope of justice, we have argued that the integration can combine the 
advantage of the ESP regarding the distribution between current and future people with the 
strength of the capabilities approach regarding distributive justice between contemporaries. 
We take the universality of life claims – a key part of the capabilities approach – as the point 
of departure for entitlement-bearer justice and the application of impartiality, both between 
contemporaries and between current and future people. The ESP, on the other hand, urges 
people not to transgress the ecosphere’s biophysical constraints in order to ensure the 
biophysical preconditions for future people. In this way, the ESP assigns moral responsibility 
to those who exceed their fair share of ecological space and requires them to reduce their 
environmental impact, which is an issue of duty-bearer justice.  
 As regards the distributive pattern, we have advocated starting from a capability threshold. 
In order for people to reach this threshold, social conditions should be secured equally, 
whereas material conditions – ultimately dependent on ecological space – should be provided 
sufficiently. A focus on the capability threshold, rather than the distribution of ecological 
space itself, can tackle the objection that ecological space is not inherently necessary for 
human flourishing. The ecological space remaining could then be distributed on an equal per 
capita basis. In line with this distributive pattern, development policies should clearly focus 
on making available affordable and sustainable alternatives, and on reducing ecological space 
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appropriation. However, we admit that various issues related to the determination of the 
threshold in view of the ecosphere’s biophysical constraints remain to be addressed.  
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